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Abstract—Access control (AC) is the core of every architectural
solution for information security. Indeed, no effective protection
scheme can abstract from the careful design of access control
policies, and infrastructures underlying modern Industrial Net-
worked Systems (INSs) are not exceptions from this point of view.
This paper presents a comprehensive framework for INS access
control. The proposed approach enables the description of both
positive and negative AC policies, by applying the Role Based Ac-
cess Control (RBAC) paradigm to typical INS implementations,
while taking into account different levels of abstraction. Suitable
techniques are adopted to check whether or not policies are
correctly implemented in the system (verification). When conflicts
are detected, possible (re)assignments of credentials to the system
users are automatically computed, that can be adopted to correct
anomalies (conflict resolution).
I. INTRODUCTION
Protecting industrial networked systems (INSs) against
cyber-threats is a recognized crucial task. In fact, because of
INS cyber-physical nature, security and safety are strictly inter-
dependent, so that a security breach can cause severe damages
not only to assets but also to people and the environment.
Despite awareness is constantly rising, security struggles to
become common practice in the design, deployment and op-
eration of INSs, and the demand for comprehensive solutions
has still to find satisfactory answers [1].
This work deals with access control (AC) in INSs. Access
control is known as a main architectural element for the
security of every IT systems. In particular, we are interested
in the implementation of policies that are designed to regulate
accesses to system resources, so as to prevent unwanted
interactions of unauthorized users with the system itself.
The contribution of this paper builds on some promising
results obtained with the innovative model and techniques
for the automated analysis of AC policies introduced in [2],
[3]. The solution presented there was able to capture both
the high level definition of AC policies and their low level
implementation details in real INSs. Typical examples of such
kind of details are h/w and s/w components, physical locations,
device interconnections, shared resources and transactions,
users’ credentials and so on. That approach is extended here by
introducing suitable techniques for fixing errors (anomalies)
in the policy implementation, when they are discovered by
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the analysis process. The abstract definition of AC policies
relies on the well-known Role Based Access Control (RBAC)
formalism [4], [5] and, according to the terminology adopted
in [2], we call Specification Model S this kind of high-level
description. Similarly, the low-level implementation details,
which are captured by means of the ad-hoc description lan-
guage discussed in [2], is called Implementation Model I.
As explained in [3] an automated s/w tool is able to process
both S and I and compute, for each system user, the sets I
and S of all actions allowed by the two models. Discrepancies
between the high-level policies and the system implementation
are then discovered by comparison of the two sets. In this way
a confirmation/denial of policy correct implementation in the
system is achieved.
This paper deals with a further important step, that is
an automated technique to fix anomalies that are detected
through the comparison above. This is obtained by searching
for suitable (re)assignments of credentials, so that each user in
the implementation model I is enabled to perform only those
actions explicitly allowed by the specification model S.
The paper is structured as follows: Sect. II deals with
some relevant works appeared in the literature, that focus
on access control policy verification and anomaly resolution
for general purpose networked systems. Sect. III recalls some
basic elements of the approach in [2], [3], that are needed to
understand the remaining part of the paper. It also introduces
extensions and changes to the specification model to manage
anomalies automatically. Sect. IV presents the proposed reso-
lution method, while in Sect. V a simple example is described
to offer the reader a flavour of our technique at work. Finally,
Sect. VI concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORKS
Access control has received significant attention in the
scientific literature. In particular, the RBAC framework [4],
[5], which relies on the definition of roles (representing
responsibilities) to which system users and permissions are
assigned, has progressively gained popularity because of its
easy and flexible policy management.
Most works dealing with access control, e.g., [6], [7], [8]
and [9], only tackle policy management issues. In particular,
they focus on the analysis of sets of abstract policies (ver-
ification of specific requirements, detection of conflicts and
suboptimal descriptions) and do not take into account their
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actual implementation in real systems. In [6] a policy analysis
tool is described, which makes use of a model checker, while
in [7], [8], [9] queries about access control policy properties
are translated into Boolean satisfiability problems and solved
using a SAT (SATisfiability) solver. Some works such as [10],
[11] propose resolution strategies besides the identification of
conflicts, however their approaches only involve the policy
definition domain.
Some papers, e.g., [12], [13], take into account the problem
of enforcing policies in real systems, and propose solutions
which, however, assume the availability of suitable enforce-
ment mechanisms. In practice, they rely on sophisticated h/w
and s/w support which, unavoidably, cannot be provided by
actual INSs, as they are typically characterized by limited
computational and communication resources and strict real-
time performance requirements.
Few works, e.g., [14], [15], [16], [17], [18], [19], deal
with the implementation of AC policies in general-purpose
systems without making assumptions about their enforcement.
In particular, [14] focuses on networked systems consisting of
firewalls and other kinds of traffic control components and,
as such, the presented approach is unsuitable for INSs which,
typically, also include other types of devices. The NP-View
tool described in [15], [16], [17] allows to check global policy
implementations by processing information about the network
topology and configuration. The tool, however, can only be
used for systems consisting of nodes running SE-Linux which
is typically not the case of INSs. The approach proposed
in [18] shares some similarities with [2], [3] as it is intended
to compute “who can do what on what” but, as for NP-View,
it needs all nodes to run SE-Linux and does not apply to
INSs. Finally, [19] deals with the automatic description of
resource access information but, unfortunately, the solution
only concerns web applications.
III. EXTENDED FORMAL MODEL
The twofold model described in [2] and consisting of both
S and I, enables the computation and comparison of two
finite sets of actions S and I for the purpose of checking
the correctness of policy implementation.
Elements in S and I are triples (user, operation, object),
i.e. (u, pi, ω) | u ∈ Users, pi ∈ Operations, ω ∈ Objects,
meaning that user u is allowed to do operation pi on object
ω. However, to find fixes automatically, ambiguities have to
be eliminated. Roughly speaking, the abstract (RBAC-based)
description should specify both actions that are enabled in
the system and actions that must be forbidden. Actions not
included in the explicit specification can then be treated as
“don’t care” situations and possibly leveraged to select a
credential assignment which satisfies the policies in S.
The new extended specification model adopted in this paper
allows designers to define two disjoint sets S+, S− ⊆ Users×
Operations × Objects describing, respectively, operations
pi ∈ Operations allowed and forbidden (i.e. allowed and
denied permissions) on system objects ω ∈ Objects by each
user u ∈ Users. Triples in Users × Operations × Objects
belonging to neither S+ nor S− concern permissions not
relevant to access control, that is whose possible assignment
to the user is not significant (don’t care permissions). Clearly
S+ ∩ S− = ∅.
The extended specification model S is still based on the
RBAC paradigm [5], [4], where the assignment of allowed and
denied permissions to users is obtained through the definition
of a suitable set of roles Roles representing collections of
responsibilities. In practice, each role r ∈ Roles is assigned
those users sharing that role and two sets of allowed/denied
permissions through the definition of the following functions1
usr asg : Roles→ 2Users (1)
prm asg+ : Roles→ 2Operations×Objects (2)
prm asg− : Roles→ 2Operations×Objects (3)
Note that a user may be assigned many roles and different
roles may be associated the permission. Moreover, since
prm asg+(r) ⊆ S+ and prm asg−(r) ⊆ S− ∀r ∈ Roles,
clearly prm asg+(r) ∩ prm asg−(r) = ∅.
When hierarchical RBAC is adopted and a hierarchical
relation (≺) is defined between elements of Roles, the as-
signments of users, allowed and denied permissions to roles
is obtained as
usr asg(r) ::=
⋃
r′r
usr asg(r′) (4)
prm asg+(r) ::=
⋃
r′r
prm asg+(r′) (5)
prm asg−(r) ::=
⋃
r′r
prm asg−(r′) (6)
Basically, users having role r also inherit roles r′ ≺ r, and
each role r, in addition to its explicitly allowed permissions
(i.e., prm asg+(r)) also inherits allowed permissions of roles
r′ ≺ r. Denied permission inheritance propagates in the
opposite direction in the role hierarchy.
Sets S+ and S− can be easily computed by associating each
user with her/his allowed and denied permissions through roles
as follows (symbol • stands for either + or −)
S•::={(u, pi, ω) ∈ Users×Operations×Objects | (7)
∃ r ∈ Roles | u ∈ usr asg(r), (pi, ω) ∈ prm asg•(r)}
When set in (7) is computed for given user u? ∈ Users, we
use notation
S•u? ::= {(u, pi, ω) ∈ S• | u = u?} (8)
S˜•u? ::= {(pi, ω) | (u?, pi, ω) ∈ S•u?} (9)
where in (9) the leftmost component of the triple has been
removed, being anyway the link to u? kept by the subscript
of S˜•.
With respect to [2], no extension is needed for the im-
plementation model I. Of course, the computation of I still
1In this paper 2W is the power set of set W , i.e., the set of all possible
subsets of W .
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remains a bit tricky and the reader may refer to [3] for details.
For the purpose of this paper it is enough remembering that,
starting from a detailed description of the real system elements
(i.e. devices, rooms, services, configurations, network links,
user credentials and so on), a suitable set of inference rules
(describing the possible interactions of a generic user with
the system) and the users’ initial states, a suitable automaton
Au can be built for each user u (u ∈ Users) describing
all possible sequences of actions s/he can carry out on the
system. Automaton edge labels (pi, ω) augmented with the user
identifiers u are triples (u, pi, ω) of set I .
To decrease the computation complexity and prevent the
typical state explosion problem, [3] showed how to compute
the automata in an optimized way. In particular, the automaton
Au for user u is obtained as the parallel composition of Aru
and AL,minu describing, respectively, the dynamic of the user
moving in the system and its actual interaction with the system
resources. Aru||AL,minu has, in general, a lower number of
states than Au, thus allowing optimization of storage resources
and computation. With a slight abuse of notation, we use Au
to mean Aru||AL,minu as well.
Given the specification and implementation models S and
I, respectively enabling the evaluation of sets S+, S−, and I ,
we use symbols S¯+ and S¯− to mean the following sets
S¯+ ::= S+ \ I (10)
S¯− ::= S− ∩ I (11)
S¯+ consists of those triples representing actions allowed
to users u ∈ Users, according to S which are actually
not enabled by the system implementation I, whereas S¯−
collects triples (u, pi, ω) describing permissions assigned to
users u ∈ Users by I, but forbidden to the same users by
policies in S. According to this description, we can say that
Definition 1. Given a specification model S and an imple-
mentation model I respectively leading to sets S+, S−, and
I (and, consequently to S¯+ and S¯−), the system correctly
implements the policies if and only if
S¯+ = ∅ ∧ S¯− = ∅ (12)
Whenever (12) does not hold true, some anomalies are
present in the policy implementation. In particular, S¯+ 6= ∅
means that some allowed permission of S is not implemented
in I, whereas when S¯− 6= ∅ some forbidden action of S is
allowed in I. We refer to the process of checking for the
presence of anomalies as policy implementation analysis or
verification.
We can now focus on the automatic correction of anomalies.
When a system modeled by I does not correctly implement the
policies modelled by S (i.e., either S¯+ or S¯− are non-empty),
the problem of anomaly resolution is that of finding suitable
changes in the system implementation so that the detected
anomalies are removed (i.e., modifying I such that (12) holds).
Note that not all modifications of I are admissible as the
functionality of the system (currently not explicitly described
by model I) needs to be preserved.
In the following we concentrate on solutions based on
changes in the assignments of credentials to users, i.e., re-
stricting the space of possible solutions by leaving the sys-
tem topology and device configurations unchanged. Since the
considered modifications can only affect user initial states
and credentials, this is clearly a first, preliminary step in the
resolution process. The main advantage is that the problem of
preserving the system functionality can be ignored, neverthe-
less useful insights can be obtained about the current system
implementation and its relation with the detected anomalies.
IV. POLICY VERIFICATION AND CORRECTION
Informally, the approach for the automated correction of
policy implementation is based on the construction of a new
kind of automaton, which extends Au discussed in [3] with
the following characteristics:
• the behaviour of a (fictious) super-user is described. This
super-user is assigned all credentials available in the
system.
• The automaton edge labels also include the credentials
enabling state transitions besides the conventional pairs
(pi, ω).
A suitable visit of this automaton allows the computation of
the set of all operations on system objects that have to be
performed prior to a given operation on a specific object can
be executed. In doing this, the visiting algorithm keeps track
of needed credentials that can be deduced from the automaton
edge labels. In this way, comprehensive solutions can be
searched, that assign each user a suitable set of credentials
enabling her/him to perform only those operations authorized
by the specification policies.
Formally, the super-user automaton A, generating language
L(A), is defined as
A ::= (Q,Σ, δ, q0) (13)
where Q and q0 are respectively the set of states and the
initial state of the super-user, with the same structure described
in [3]. With respect to Au for conventional users, A deals
with extended events each one also taking into account the
credential c which is required to enable the event (pi, ω).
Formally, the set of extended events is Σ ::= Operations ×
Objects×{C ∪ {ε}} and the automaton transition function
is δ : Q × Σ → Q. This means that performing the same
operation pi on object ω by owning different credentials leads
to different transitions in A (i.e., (pi, ω, c1) 6= (pi, ω, c2)).
Moreover, notation (pi, ω, ε) is used for labels where operation
pi is performed on object ω without owning any specific
credential.
Evening in case of the super-user case too, A can then be
efficiently computed as the parallel composition of two simpler
automata Ar and AL,min, that is A = Ar||AL,min.
Roughly speaking, A is essentially a super-automaton with
respect to Au, which is able to describe all possible se-
quences of operations a hypothetical super-user, owning all
available credentials, can perform on the system objects. As
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Fig. 1. Example automaton G
a consequence, A provides an overview of how access to
the system resources can be obtained by following different
paths, i.e., performing different sequences of operations and,
possibly, exploiting different sets of credentials (this somehow
resembles what happens in attack graphs).
Once the structure of A has been determined, the main
idea is to use it to compute, for each pair (pi, ω) such that
∃ q, q′ ∈ Q, c ∈ C | δ(q, (pi, ω, c)) = q′, the sets of operations
which, when performed in a specific order, actually enable the
execution of (pi, ω) (i.e., change the state of the user so that
s/he is allowed to perform (pi, ω)), and, from these, derive the
sets of credentials that enable the operation itself.
To this purpose let us introduce the following definitions.
A. Enabling events
Definition 2. Given the set of events Σ and a string s ∈ Σ∗,
function TΣ(s) : Σ∗ → 2Σ is defined as2:
TΣ(s) ::= {e ∈ Σ | ∃ t, v ∈ Σ∗ : s = tev}
Basically, given a sequence s obtained as a concatenation of
elements in Σ, function TΣ(s) returns the set of all events in
s, i.e. it “tokenizes” s. As an example, if we consider string
s = abbe ∈ L(G), where L(G) is the language generated
by example automaton G = (Q,Σ, δ, q0) depicted in Fig. 1,
TΣ(s) = {a, b, e}.
Definition 3. Given A = (Q,Σ, δ, q0), generating language
L(A), event e ∈ Σ, and set V ∈ 2Σ\{e}, function LA :
2Σ\{e} × {e} → B is defined as:
LA(V, e) ::=
∃s ∈ Σ∗ | se ∈ L(A), TΣ(s) = V
∧
@V ′ ⊂ V | ∃s′ ∈ Σ∗ | s′e ∈ L(A), TΣ(s′) = V ′
Given A, V , and e defined as above, we say that V is an
enabling set of events for e in A. V ∈ 2Σ\{e} means V ⊆
Σ \ {e}, whereas B stands for the boolean domain.
Intuitively, given a set V of events belonging to Σ \ {e},
and event e ∈ Σ, where Σ is the set of events of a certain
automaton A, LA(V, e) is true if and only if events of V
belong to some path in A (not containing e), where e is the
2Notation W ∗ indicate the Kleene closure of set W , i.e. W ∗ is the set of
all strings of any length obtained concatenating elements of W .
next event, and there is not V ′ ⊂ V with the same property. To
clarify the notion of enabling set of events, let us refer again to
Fig. 1. We consider event e ∈ Σ and sets V1, V2, V3 ∈ Σ \ {e}
defined as V1 = ε, V2 = {a} and V3 = {a, b}. By computing
LG(Vi, e) we obtain that while V2 is an enabling set of events
for e in G, V1 and V3 are not as e /∈ L(G) and even if abe ∈
L(G), V2 ⊂ V3.
Definition 4. Given A = (Q,Σ, δ, q0), and event e ∈ Σ,
function EA : Σ→ 22Σ\{e} is
EA(e) =
{
V ∈ 2Σ\{e} : LA(V, e)
}
(14)
Definitions above state that, given a generic automaton
describing a system behavior, any event e in event set Σ is
characterized by a sets enabling set of events EA(e). Event
e ∈ Σ may occur (is enabled) if and only if all events in any
of the sets in EA(e) have already occurred. Note that the set
of enabling events for e ∈ Σ may be EA(e) = {{ε}} meaning
that e is enabled directly in the initial state of A (i.e., it is not
enabled by other events). Moreover, EA(e) = {{ε}} is not the
same as EA(e) = ∅, as the latter indicates that event e ∈ Σ
can never happen in A (i.e., no transition in A is associated
to event e).
Referring again to the example automaton G and consid-
ering event e ∈ Σ, we obtain that EG(e) = {{a}, {d, f}},
meaning that, e necessarily follows either event a or both
events d and f in G. Several algorithms allow the computation
of EA(e) given A and e ∈ Σ.
Definition 5. Given an automaton A = (Q,Σ, δ, q0), an event
e˜ ∈ Σ, and the function EA, we define function FA(e) as
FA(e) ::=
∑
V ∈EA(e)
(∏
e∈V
e
)
(15)
Referring again to the example automaton G, and consid-
ering event e ∈ Σ, we obtain that FG(e) = a + d · f . In
the following we will deal with automata as (13), and we will
provide some refinement of the above definitions, in particular
Def. 5 will be enhanced by Def. 8.
B. Enabling function computation
Definition 6. Given the set of events e = (pi, ω, c) ∈ Σ, let us
define
c(e) ::= c
C(Σ) ::= {c(e) | e ∈ Σ}
e˜ ::= (pi, ω) | e = (pi, ω, c)
Σ˜ ::= {e˜ | e ∈ Σ}
In practice, with little abuse of notation, c(e) and C(Σ)
respectively return the credential c of event e and the set of the
credentials of Σ, whereas the remaining two functions drop the
credential from the event representation(s). We call e˜ and Σ˜
respectively reduced event and set of reduced events and, in the
following, (pi, ω) is referred to as reduced event independently
on whether it is obtained from some Σ.
4
Fig. 2. Room and network topology.
Definition 7. Given Σ and the reduced event e˜ = (pi, ω), Σe˜
is
Σe˜ ::= {(pi, ω, c) ∈ Σ | (pi, ω) = e˜}
Definition 8. Given A, its set of events Σ, the corresponding
set of reduced events Σ˜ and the reduced event e˜, FA(e˜) is
FA(e˜) ::=
∑
e∈Σe˜
 ∑
V ∈EA(e)
 ∏
c∈C(V )∪{c(e)}
c
 (16)
FA(e˜) is used to build an expression containing symbols
c i.e. credentials identifiers, and operators · and +. In the
following, such an expression is treated as a boolean function
where symbols c are boolean variables. From a practical point
of view the meaning of c here is twofold: s is a credential
identifier when (16) is constructed, but also a boolean variable
when (16) is computed.
Definition 9. Given A and the reduced event e˜ leading to
function FA(e˜) (16), user u and set of credentials C belonging
to u’s initial state, FA(e˜)|u is FA(e˜) where each boolean
variable c is set to 1 if and only if c ∈ C, and 0 otherwise.
Roughly speaking, FA(e˜)|u is the result of the computation
of FA(e˜) with each variable bound to 1 if and only if user
u owns a credential with the same name, and bound to 0
otherwise.
Theorem 1. Given a system modeled by implementation
model I (and automaton A derived from I), some access
control policies modeled by specification model S (leading to
specification sets S+, S−), any correct assignment of user
credentials (i.e., any user credential assignment preventing
implementation anomalies) is such that for each u ∈ Users
the following holds true ∧
e˜∈S˜+u
FA(e˜)|u
 ∧
 ∧
e˜∈S˜−u
FA(e˜)|u
 = 1 (17)
where sets S˜+u and S˜
−
u come from S through (9).
To make the reading lighter, the proof has been omitted here.
Note that the set of equations (17) may have one solution,
multiple solutions or no solution at all. A possible way to
compute a solution (if any exists) is to use a SAT solver.
TABLE I
SPECIFICATION MODEL S
Po
prm asg+(Po) {(run,MBSL), (run, IGS)}
prm asg−(Po) {(admin,MBSL), (admin, IGS), (admin, PLC)}
usr asg(Po) {Tom}
Ps
prm asg+(Ps) {(run,MBSL), (run, IGS), (admin,MBSL),
(admin, IGS), (admin, PLC)}
prm asg−(Ps) ∅
usr asg(Ps) {Amy}
TABLE II
USERS’ SETS OF ASSIGNED CREDENTIALS Cu
Tom CTom = {KOA,KAB , CPCTom, CPLCusr, CIGSusr}
Amy CAmy = {KOA,KAB , CPCAmy , CIGSadm, CMBSLadm}
sup Csup = {KOA,KAB , CPCTom, CPCAmy ,
CPLCusr, CIGSusr, CIGSadm, CMBSLadm}
V. EXAMPLE
A. System description
In order to have a better understanding of our approach, let
us consider the simple INS sketched in Fig. 2. The whole sys-
tem is hosted in two rooms, A and B, communicating through
door dAB . Room O models a generic external environment.
Users in O can enter room A only if they own key KOA
required to open the plant entrance door dOA, while they can
move from A to B (or from B to A) by using key KAB ,
needed to open door dAB . Once in room A, a user can leave
the plant area without using any credential.
Room B contains an industrial PC (PLC) running an
ISaGRAF soft-PLC (IGS), an Ethernet switch (SW ) and a
Modbus slave device (MBSL). SW enables communications
between PLC, MBSL and other devices not located in B,
such as the supervisory PC (PC) in room A. Dashed lines in
Fig. 2 represent communication links.
To keep the example simple, we assume that only two roles,
namely plant operator (Po) and plant supervisor (Ps), have
been defined by policy designers, and Po ≺ Ps, i.e., Ps is
higher than Po in the role hierarchy. Moreover, users assigned
to Po are enabled to perform operational activities (run) on
both the ISaGRAF soft-PLC and Modbus slave, but they are
not allowed to carry out management operations (admin)
on the two objects. Conversely, users assigned to Ps can
administrate both the ISaGRAF soft-PLC and Modbus slave
and are not explicitly assigned denied permissions. Finally,
only two users, Tom and Amy, are assigned to roles Po and
Ps, respectively.
The specification model S derived from the description
above is summarized in Table I, where all roles are listed
together with their explicitly allowed and denied permissions,
as well as their user assignments. By using (8), and keeping
in mind that Po ≺ Ps so that (5) and (6) apply, we obtain the
specification sets for Tom and Amy in Fig. 3.
Fig. 4, instead, shows those data elements in I, that are
mostly significant to understand the example, while the initial
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S+Tom= {(Tom, run,MBSL), (Tom, run, IGS)}
S−Tom=
{
(Tom, admin,MBSL), (Tom, admin, IGS),
(Tom, admin, PLC)
}
S+Amy=
{
(Amy, run,MBSL), (Amy, run, IGS),
(Amy, admin,MBSL), (Amy, admin, IGS),
(Amy, admin, PLC)
}
S−Amy= ∅
Fig. 3. Specification sets S•u, • = +,−, for users Tom and Amy.
assignment of credentials to the two users is listed in Table. II.
In details object PC, contained in object A (as highlighted
by its path 〈A〉), is equipped with a single network port, ppPC ,
bound to MAC address MACPC and IP address IPPC . A
user group is defined for PC, which includes two accounts
uTom and uAmy . PC supports only one operation (login),
guarded by precondition phy acc. This means that a user shall
have physical access to device PC (i.e., s/he must be in room
A) in order to log in. login can be successfully performed
by owning either credential (i.e., password) CPCTom or
CPCAmy , so that the user becomes logged on PC, respectively
as uTom or uAmy , in the end. Note that the empty set at the end
of the PC description means that no filtering rule is defined
for the device.
Similarly, object PLC is contained in room B and is
equipped with one physical network port, ppPLC , bound to
MAC address MACPLC and IP address IPPLC . A user
group is defined on PLC as well, consisting of a single
account (uuser). Two operations are defined for PLC, namely
login and admin. A user can login on PLC in two alternative
ways, that is by exploiting a physical access (i.e., the user is
in room B) or remotely (precondition rem acc), through an
SSH channel, if s/he is already logged on some host and a TCP
connection exists to port 22 of PLC with IP address IPPLC .
In either cases the user needs to own credential cPLCusr which
logs her/him on PLC as uuser.
The loc acc precondition for operation admin means that
the user must be logged on PLC with any username belonging
to group user to be able to invoke it. This basically models
the increase of privilege in accessing PLC, from simple user
to administrator.
The Modbus slave, MBSL supports two operations (run
and admin) that can be invoked remotely through TCP
connections to ports 532 and 8080, respectively. No credential
in needed to execute run, while (admin,MBSL) can be
performed only by owners of password cMBSLadm.
IGS models the ISaGRAF application running on PLC as
shown in its location path 〈B,PLC〉. Two operations, run and
admin, are defined also in this case. To “run” the soft-PLC, a
user must be logged on either PLC with a username belonging
to group user or some other host connected to the PLC
port 12001 via the UDP protocol. In both cases credential
cIGSuser is necessary for authentication. Operation admin
can be executed by users logged on PLC as members of
group user and owning credential cIGSadm. Differently from
PC and PLC, no account is defined for MBSL and IGS:
only credentials are used to distinguish between operational
and administrative privileges.
Room descriptions in the lower right corner of Fig. 4 assert
that only operation enter can be performed on A and B
(through doors dOA and dAB) by owning appropriate keys
(KOA and/or KAB). Note that the data model also includes
descriptions for the external environment O, switch SW
and communication links, but they are not shown here for
conciseness reasons.
B. Policy verification and anomaly resolution
We now briefly describe the resulting automaton A for the
considered INS. We assume the super-user to be, initially, in
the same room (i.e., in O) as Tom and Amy. Fig. 5 shows
Ar, describing the dynamics of the super-user owning all
credentials defined in the system (see user sup in Table. II),
who moves among rooms. In the figure, labels in the form
(pi, ω)[c1, c2, . . . , cn] standing on single edge of Ar represents
n different edges (all originating and ending in the same
states as the original one) each one labeled as (pi, ω, ci).
The automaton shows that the super-user can enter room A
and B in sequence (or move in the opposite direction), and,
depending on whether s/he is in room A or B, access PC or
PLC (since the precondition phy acc of the login operation
defined for both hosts is satisfied) by exhibiting the necessary
credentials.
The optimized local access automaton AL,min is shown
in Fig. 6: language L(AL,min) describes the sequences of
operations the super-user can perform, assuming all devices
and their resources to be in her/his same virtual room (i.e.,
it describes the dynamics of access to resources without
considering their location).
Starting from the initial state, the super-user can login on
either PC or PLC as s/he owns the required credentials (i.e.,
cPCTom or cPCAmy for PC and cPLCusr for PLC). The
two actions ((login, PC) and (login, PLC)) lead to different
states in AL,min, because the superuser logged on PC can
perform both run and admin on MBSL, but only run IGS
(by exploiting the remote connection), since admin on IGS
requires the user to be logged in on PLC.
Automaton A shown in Fig. 10 is finally obtained from the
parallel composition of Ar and AL,min (and ignoring prefix
phy on transition labels which are only necessary for automata
composition). From A, following the process described in
Sect. IV, we derive the enabling functions of credentials Fu(e)
shown in Fig. 8 for any permission (pi, ω) appearing in the
policies (i.e., in the specification sets S•). As an example,
action (enter,A) can only be performed by users owning
credentials KOA (note that, actually KOA is necessary to
perform any action in the system, and, as such the key appears
in all functions in Fig. 8). Analogously, action (admin, IGS)
requires a user to own credential cIGSadm and to either login
on PLC remotely, after logging in on PC with credential
cPCTom or cPCAmy , or physically, meaning that the user
needs key KAB and password cPLCuser.
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Devices :
PC,
{〈login,{〈phy acc cPCTom 〈A,PC〉:uTom〉,〈phy acc cPCAmy 〈A,PC〉:uAmy〉,} 〉} , 〈A〉,{(uTom, user),(uAmy, user)} , {〈ppPC , {〈MACPC , {IPPC}〉}〉}, ∅
PLC,
〈login,
{
〈phy acc cPLCusr 〈B,PLC〉:uuser〉,〈rem acc 〈22, IPPLC , TCP 〉 cPLCusr 〈B,PLC〉:uuser〉
}〉
〈admin, {〈loc acc 〈B,PLC〉:uuser〉} 〉
 , 〈B〉, {(uuser, user)} , {〈ppPLC , {〈MACPLC , {IPPLC}〉}〉}, ∅
MBSL,
{
〈run, {〈rem acc 〈532, IPMBSL, TCP 〉〉}〉 ,〈admin, {〈rem acc 〈8080, IPMBSL, TCP 〉 cMBSLadm〉}〉
}
, 〈B〉, ∅, {〈ppMBSL, {〈MACMBSL, {IPMBSL}〉}}, ∅
IGS,
 〈run,
{
〈loc acc 〈B,PLC〉:user cIGSusr〉,〈rem acc 〈12001, IPPLC , UDP 〉 cIGSusr〉
} 〉
〈admin, {〈loc acc 〈B,PLC〉:user cIGSadm〉} 〉
 , 〈B,PLC〉, ∅, ∅, ∅
Rooms :
A, {〈enter, {〈dOA, {KOA}〉, 〈dAB , {KAB}〉}〉}, 〈〉, ∅, ∅, ∅
B, {〈enter, {〈dAB , {KAB}〉}〉}, 〈〉, ∅, ∅, ∅
Fig. 4. Fragments of the data model
O A B
(enter,A) [KOA]
(enter,O) [KOA]
(enter,B)[KAB ]
(enter,A) [KAB ] (phy login,PLC) [cPLCusr]
(phy login,PC) [cPCTom, cPCAmy]
Fig. 5. Automaton Ar .
L0 L1
L2
Local access:
L0 = ∅, L1 =PC:user,L2 =PLC:user
(phy login,PC) [cPCTom, cPCAmy]
(phy login,PLC) [cPLCusr ]
(phy login,PC) [cPCTom, cPCAmy],
(run,MBSL),(admin,MBSL) [cMBSLadm]
(run,IGS) [cIGSusr],
(phy login,PLC) [cPLCusr],
(phy login,PC) [cPCTom, cPCAmy],
(login,PLC) [cPLCusr], (admin,PLC) []
(admin,MBSL) [cMBSLadm], (run,MBSL) [],
(run,IGS) [cIGSusr] , (admin,IGS) [cIGSadm]
(phy login,PLC) [cPLCusr]
(login,PLC) [cPLCusr]
Fig. 6. Automaton AL,min.
By computing enabling function values for users Tom and
Amy, assuming their credential sets are those described in
Table. II, we derive the implementation sets shown in Fig. 7.
ITom=
{
(enter,A), (enter,B), (login, PC), (login, PLC),
(run, IGS), (run,MBSL)(admin, PLC)
}
IAmy=
{
(enter,A), (enter,B), (login, PC), (login, PLC),
(run, IGS), (run,MBSL) (admin,MBSL)
}
Fig. 7. Implementation sets Iu computed for users Tom and Amy.
By applying (10), (11) and (12) to sets I = ITom ∪ IAmy ,
S+ = S+Tom ∪S+Amyand S− = S−Tom ∪S−Amy (see Fig. 9) we
can see that the policies are not correctly implemented by the
system as, differently from what expected, Amy is allowed to
administrate neither PLC nor IGS, while Tom, that should
not be allowed any administrator privilege is able to perform
(admin, PLC) in the current system implementation.
F((enter,A)) = KOA
F((enter,B)) = KOA ·KAB
F((log, PC)) = KOA · (cPCTom + cPCAmy)
F((log, PLC)) = KOA · (cPCTom + cPCAmy) · cPLCusr+
KOA ·KAB · CPLCusr
F((run,MBSL)) = KOA · (cPCTom + CPCAmy)+
KOA ·KAB · cPLCusr
F((run, IGS)) = KOA · (cPCTom + cPCAmy) · cIGSusr+
KOA ·KAB · cPLCTom · cIGSusr
F((admin, PLC)) = KOA · (cPCTom + cPCAmy) · cPLCusr+
KOA ·KAB · cPLCusr
F((admin,MBSL)) = KOA · (cPCTom + cPCAmy) · cMBSLadm+
KOA ·KAB · cPLCusr · cMBSLadm
F((admin, IGS)) = KOA · (cPCTom + cPCAmy) · cPLCusr · cIGSadm+
KOA ·KAB · cPLCusr · cIGSadm
Fig. 8. Enabling functions
S+ \ I = S¯+ = {(Amy, admin, PLC), (Amy, admin, IGS)}
S− ∩ I = S¯−= {(Tom, admin, PLC)}
Fig. 9. Conflicts highlighted by the analysis.
To find user credential assignments that correctly enforce
the specified access control policies (if any), we use a SAT
solver to find solution(s) (if any) making (17) true. The result
of the SAT solver analysis is shown in Table III, where the
first rows show two possible correct credential assignments
for user Tom and the latter a single one for user Amy.
As can be seen, to prevent Tom from administrating PLC,
he should be deprived of credential cPLCusr, i.e., he should
not be able to login on PLC which is the action enabling
(admin, PLC). Moreover, the analysis shows that Tom does
not need to enter room B (providing him with key KAB is
unnecessary for the correct policy enforcement), as asserted
by credential assignment C2Tom. Conversely, Amy should be
allowed to login on PLC to perform both (admin, PLC) and
(admin, IGS), as stated by the new credential assignment
C1Amy which includes password cPLCAmy .
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O,L0 A,L0 A,L1 A,L2
B,L0 B,L1 B,L2
Local access:
L0 = ∅, L1 =PC:user,L2 =PLC:user
(enter,A) [KOA]
(enter,O) [KOA]
(en
ter,B
)
[K
A
B
](e
n
te
r,
A
)
[K
A
B
]
(login,PLC) [cPLCusr]
(en
ter,B
)
[K
A
B
](e
n
te
r,
A
)
[K
A
B
]
(login,PLC) [cPLCusr]
(e
n
te
r,
B
)
[K
A
B
] (en
ter,A
)
[K
A
B
]
(login,PC) [cPCTom, cPCAmy] (login,PLC) [cPLCusr]
(login,PC) [cPCTom, cPCAmy],
(run,IGS) [cIGSusr],
(run,MBSL) [],
(admin,MBSL) [cMBSLadm]
(login,PLC) [cPLCusr],
(admin,PLC) []
(run,MBSL) [] , (admin,MBSL) [cMBSLadm],
(run,IGS) [cIGSusr],
(admin,IGS) [cIGSadm]
(login,PC) [cPCTom, cPCAmy], (run,MBSL) [],
(admin,MBSL) [cMBSLadm], (run,IGS) [cIGSusr],
(login,PLC) [cPLCusr],
(admin,PLC) []
(login,PC) [cPCTom, cPCAmy],
(run,MBSL) [],
(admin,MBSL) [cMBSLadm],
(run,IGS) [cIGSusr],
(admin,IGS) [cIGSadm]
Fig. 10. Automaton A = Ar||AL,min.
TABLE III
CONFLICT RESOLUTION
Tom
C1Tom = {KOA, cPCTom, cIGSusr}
C2Tom = {KOA,KAB , cPCTom, cIGSusr}
Amy C1Amy = {KOA,KAB , cPCAmy, cPLCusr, cIGSadm,
cMBSLadm}
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS
This paper has presented an automated technique to fix
access policy implementation anomalies in INSs. The pro-
posed approach builds on previous works that dealt with the
analysis of access policy through innovative twofold modeling
techniques.
The extended model and automated procedure we have
described here enable: (i) the high level definition of positive
and negative access control policies and (ii) the fine-grained
description of the industrial networked system implementation
details. Discrepancies and errors found in the policy imple-
mentation can then be discovered by the verification process
and possibly fixed by suitable (re)assignments of the user
permissions.
Future works will be aimed at extending this work in two
directions: add different optimization strategies in order to
automatically choose the best solutions for correction and
increase the capability of our approach in order to also perform
the refinement of high level policies to the INS low-level
implementation.
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